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“Some paintings become famous because, being durable, they are
viewed by successive generations, in each of which are likely to be
found a few appreciative eyes. I know a painting so evanescent that
it is seldom viewed at all, except by some wandering deer. It is a
river who wields the brush, and it is the same river who, before I can
bring my friends to view his work, erases it forever from human
1
view. After that it exists only in my mind’s eye.”

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, environmental pollution has spawned a great
deal of public and private litigation and related governmental
investigations.
One type of claim, however, has seen little
contemporary litigation: claims for natural resource damages
(“NRD”). The relative dearth of NRD claims being pursued is
unusual given the breadth of available legal theories and the
compelling public interest at stake. The goal of this article is to
explain the importance of NRD programs and evaluate the process of
bringing and defending NRD claims in the United States.
A strong NRD program benefits society in many diverse ways.
Economic enhancement and increased protection for environmental,
recreational, and historical interests are but a few examples2. A U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Service article espoused the benefits of a strong NRD
program:
NRDAR [Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration
Program] ensures healthy fish and wildlife populations, as well as
healthy lands and waters on which they depend. NRDAR ensures
healthy wetlands, which support more species of wildlife than any
other habitat type.
Wetlands are especially important to
commercial saltwater fish and shellfish. Wetlands benefit people by
providing recreational opportunities, recharging groundwater
supplies, reducing flood damage, and controlling erosion. The
economic benefits of wetland resources are estimated at more than
$1 trillion annually. NRDAR benefits the nation’s 35 million
anglers, 14 million hunters, and 63 million wildlife viewers who rely
on healthy fish and wildlife populations for their outdoor pursuits.
NRDAR helps maintain a thriving economy by ensuring healthy

1. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 93 (Oxford University Press ed., 2001)
(1949).
2. See generally New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Natural Resource
Restoration, http://www.nj.gov/dep/nrr (last visited Sept. 4, 2006).
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resources that provide recreational opportunities. Fishing annually
brings in $38 billion; hunting, $21 billion; and wildlife viewing, $27
billion. These earnings represent about 1.4% of the Gross
Domestic Product. NRDAR helps safeguard more than 2 million
full- and part-time jobs related to fishing, hunting, and wildlife
viewing. NRDAR benefits a nearly $4 billion dollar per year
3
commercial fishing industry.

In addition, property owners and other real estate interests
adjacent to restored areas benefit by removing stigmas that lower
property values, promoting economic development and enhancing the
use and enjoyment of property. The establishment of new natural
resources, such as habitats for certain species, might create more
development opportunities in other areas over time. Healthy natural
resources are also important to Native American Tribes and help to
maintain “their sovereign rights to land, water, fishing, hunting, and
gathering, as well as cultural, spiritual, and traditional activities that
depend on healthy resources.”4 For all Americans, there remains a
strong desire to leave things better for the next generation.
The overriding public interest in the preservation and
reclamation of natural resources is one of the most important reasons
for the development of NRD programs. As the nature of the public
interest in natural resources has evolved, so has environmental
legislation. The focus of the first significant environmental laws in the
1950s and 1960s was significantly different than the present day focus
of environmental legislation. Initially, environmental efforts were
prompted by preservationist ideals - the desire to maintain the
“great” natural resources and save such sites from exploitation. For
example, in the 1960s, the proposed construction of a dam in the
Grand Canyon raised awareness about environmental protectionism 5
the need to preserve the legacy of our nation’s natural resources.
Legislation was directed primarily at the behavior of government
6
Congress enacted
agencies, as opposed to private individuals.
environmental legislation to “ensure that government agencies
respected social and cultural values when pursuing development

3. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, BEYOND CLEANUP: : RESTORING AMERICA’S
NATURAL
HERITAGE
2
(Jan.
1,
1998),
available
at
http://www.fws.gov/contaminants/Documents/beyond_cleanup.pdf..
4. Id.
5. Richard L. Berkman & W. Kip Viscusi, Damming The West: Ralph Nader’s Study
Group Report on the Bureau of Reclamation 75 (1973).
6. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1158 (1995).
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projects,”7 rather than to address the illegal conduct of polluters and
the consequences of their actions.
In effect, we have begun to move from a “great places” approach
to natural resources to a “reclaiming” approach. While a few “great
place” battles still continue, such as the effort to preserve the Arctic
Wilderness, today environmental activism and legislation is inspired
by the need to restore and prevent further exploitation of injured and
diminishing natural resources such as the nation’s coastal areas.
Environmentalism is motivated less by the need for preservation and
more by the desire for reclamation. People now understand two
things about natural resources. First, natural resources can be
salvaged, even in seemingly impossible industrial and urban locales.
The technology and the capacity to reclaim and recreate natural
resources have improved exponentially and will continue to improve.
The Meadowlands in New Jersey is a classic example of this type of
transformation potential.8 Second, people take property rights more
seriously and also understand that the public’s right to its property or
“commons” is important for both monetary and nonmonetary
reasons.9 Natural resources that were formerly viewed with little
interest or real understanding, such as groundwater, have generated a

7. Id.
8. At one time the world’s largest dump
“[t]he Hackensack Meadowlands is perhaps the largest urban wetland complex in the
northeastern United States. It lies along the Hackensack River and is located within
the New York-Newark metropolitan area. Given this location, the Meadowlands has
been greatly impacted by urban and port development . . . . The New Jersey
Meadowlands Commission (“NJMC”) is acquiring wetlands and management rights
and making zoning changes . . . in an effort to protect the remaining wetlands. Plans
are underway to restore the Hackensack Meadowlands ecosystem . . . . Wetland
restoration and enhancement efforts include restoring tidal flow, removing
contaminated soils, creating open water areas, controlling invasive species . . . and
regulating water levels . . . . The main hope for the future of Meadowlands wetlands as
well as for other urban wetlands is that as many as possible will be set aside as open
space for our benefit and for future generations and that wetland restoration efforts
will be accelerated to revitalize significantly impacted wetlands and to rebuild lost
wetlands wherever practicable. Wetlands are natural resources that, among other
things, increase the quality of life for urban residents across America.
“RALPH W. TINER, JOHN Q. SWORDS, & BOBBI JO MCLAIN, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE,
WETLAND STATUS AND TRENDS FOR THE HACKENSACK MEADOWLANDS 1, 27 (Dec. 2002),
available at http://library.fws.gov/Wetlands/Hackensack.pdf.
9. See Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae and the Attorney General
as the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 57, 94-96 (Fall
2005). Historically, the public “common” was a public area used by villagers for livestock
grazing. Additionally, the villagers had the right to “cut wood, to fish, and to cut peat or turf for
fuel.” Id. at 64. The common area was used and regulated by the villagers for purposes of
mutual sustainability and benefit.
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special need for attention in light of the crucial role they will play in
the future of this country’s survival.10
The enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental
Compensation, Response and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA” or
“Superfund”)11 was an attempt by Congress to respond to the massive
pollution and contamination of the environment in the United States.
However, as the past twenty-five years have demonstrated, CERCLA
has not been effective in enabling the recovery of damages for
pollution and restoring injured natural resources.12 In fact, CERCLA
has actually enabled polluters to prolong any meaningful cleanup of
natural resources by permitting them to engage in years of ineffective
and mostly useless remediation and feasibility studies.13 Moreover,
the response time of CERCLA is poor, thus prolonging what is
14
already a tediously slow road to restoration.
The pursuit of NRD is the last chance to accomplish what the
United States originally wanted to do with Superfund - to cleanup the
nation’s natural resources and make the polluters compensate both
the government and the public for the injuries that they have suffered
and will continue to endure. Because our natural resources are being
destroyed and are disappearing at an alarming rate, NRD litigation
has become increasingly important to preserve these natural assets
for the public and for future generations.
II. BRINGING AN NRD CLAIM
A. Who is the Proper Party to File Suit?
When an injured natural resource is privately owned, property
laws dictate that the owner of that natural resource is entitled to file
suit and recover damages from a potentially responsible party
15
In the United States, the Constitution, statutes, and
(“PRP”).
common law protect private property rights. However, when natural
resources owned by the public are damaged, questions arise as to who
is entitled to sue for damages on behalf of the public, and of the type
10. See id. at 83.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
12. See generally Allan Kanner, Rethinking Superfund, 20 NAT’L ASS’N ENVTL. PROF’S
News 19 (May-June 1995).
13. See Robert W. McGee, Superfund: It’s Time for Repeal After a Decade of Failure, 12
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 165, 170 (1993).
14. Id. at 168-69.
15. See generally 42 U.S.C.§ 9607 (2000).
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of behavior constituting permissible use of public property. For
example, an individual’s right to operate a polluting facility on his
private property must be balanced with the public’s right to have a
river adjacent to the property free from contamination. Ultimately, it
is the governmental trustees who have both the responsibility and the
affirmative obligation to protect natural resources held in trust for the
benefit of the public and to decide when and how to do so.
Natural resource trustees’ responsibilities include assessing the
extent of injury to natural resources and restoring natural
resources. In order to execute these responsibilities, a trustee can
negotiate with PRPs to obtain PRP-financed or PRP-conducted
assessment and restoration of natural resource injury, sue PRPs for
the costs of assessing and restoring the natural resource, or conduct
the assessment and restore natural resources and then seek
reimbursement from PRPs, and, in limited circumstances, from
16
Superfund.

Both the federal and state governments are responsible for protecting
and maintaining the natural resources that fall within their respective
17
jurisdictions.
1. State Trustees
Traditionally, states have had the responsibility of protecting
natural resources for the benefit of the public. A state may use the
common law public trust doctrine and police power authority to bring
suit to recover damages for injured natural resources and to restore
18
the same. These common law doctrines evolved in recognition of
the inherently broad authority states have over natural resources
within their boundaries. For example, in Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that “the state has
an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all
the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether
its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall
breathe pure air.”19 Accordingly, as the Supreme Court later noted, a
state may assert a claim to protect “the atmosphere, the water, and

16. Allan Kanner, Tribal Sovereignty and Natural Resource Damages, 25 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 93, 107 (2004).
17. In some cases, these rights have been passed to citizens under appropriate
circumstances, such as with a federal citizen’s suit pursuant to a state statute in New Jersey’s
Environmental Rights Act. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-1-35A-14 (2000).’’
18. See Kanner, supra note 9, at 88-89.
19. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S.
592, 604 (1982).
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the forests within its territory, irrespective of the assent or dissent of
the private owners of the land most immediately concerned.”20
States exercise police power for the protection of public health
and welfare pursuant to the powers reserved to states by the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.21 Through its police
power a state may regulate the release of contaminants into the air,22
protect the quality of water,23 control land use through zoning
24
regulations, regulate storage and disposal of solid and hazardous
25
substances, and protect the public interest in wildlife.26

20. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
21. Similarly, the common law theory of parens patriae is illustrative of states’ power and
authority to protect the interests of its citizens. Through parens patriae suits, states have sought
redress for injuries to “quasi-sovereign” interests. These “quasi-sovereign” interests include
state interest in its general economy or environment, Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56 (1890); interstate water management,
Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 509 (1932); pollution-free interstate waters, Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); protection of the air and earth from interstate pollutants,
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907); and the general economy of the state,
Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945), rev’g denied, 324 U.S. 890 (1945).
22. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-401(A) (1987); Nw. Laundry v. City of Des Moines,
239 U.S. 486, 494-95 (1916); State v. Burns, 591 P.2d 563, 566 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Lees v. Bay
Area Air Pollution Control Dist., 48 Cal. Rptr. 295, 299-300 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (holding
that the regulation of air pollution is “essential and represents a lawful and proper exercise of
the police power”).
23. See, e.g., Morshead v. Cal. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., 119 Cal. Rptr. 586, 589
(Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that “prevention of water pollution is a legitimate government
objective in furtherance of which the police power may be exercised”); Commonwealth v.
Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871, 885 (Pa. 1974) (“abatement of water pollution is
unquestionably a reasonable exercise of the police power in the abstract”); Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 334 A.2d 790, 796 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
24. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 277 P.2d 45, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (“[z]oning is inherent
in the police power”); Johnson v. Village of Villa Park, 18 N.E.2d 887, 889 (Ill. 1938) (“Cities
and villages have the right to adopt zoning ordinances as an exercise of their police power and
thereby impose a reasonable restraint upon the use of private property.”); Roselle v. Wright,
122 A.2d 506, 510 (N.J. 1956).
25. See, e.g., State v. Byrd, 708 So. 2d 401, 405 (La. 1998); Dep’t of Transp. v. PSC Res.,
Inc., 419 A.2d 1151, 1158-59 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980); Meyers v. Town of Cornwall, 192
N.Y.S.2d 734, 738 (N.Y. 1959) (“a municipality may, in the exercise of its police power, adopt an
ordinance which regulates the collection, storage or disposition of refuse and garbage”).
26. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-1-101(1) (2006) (“It is the policy of the state of Colorado that
the wildlife and their environment are to be protected, preserved, enhanced, and managed for
the use, benefit, and enjoyment of the people of this state and its visitors.”); People v. K. Sakai
Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Fla. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm’n v.
Flotilla, Inc., 636 So. 2d 761, 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Stewart, 253 S.E.2d 638, 640
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (“As the State’s wildlife population is a natural resource of the State held
by it in trust for its citizens, the enactment of laws reasonably related to the protection of such
wildlife constitutes a valid exercise of the police power vested in the General Assembly.”)
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The public trust doctrine has its origins in ancient common law.27
During its early development in American jurisprudence, the doctrine
was used to retain fisheries and land under navigable waters in trust
for the use and benefit of the public.28 The public trust doctrine was
first applied in case law pertaining to disputes over navigable waters.
These cases began with the premise that navigable beds, critical to
commerce, were owned by the state and held in common by the state
for public use. In the early American case of Home v. Richards,29 the
court held that the bed of a navigable river within the Commonwealth
30
could not be granted to an individual. The general scope of the
doctrine is well articulated in the seminal United States Supreme
Court case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois:
That the state holds the title to the lands under the navigable
waters of Lake Michigan, within its limits, in the same manner that
the state holds title to soils under tide water, by common law, we
have already shown; . . . It is a title held in trust for the people of the
state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters . . . and have
liberty of fishing therein . . . The trust devolving upon the state for
the public, and which can only be discharged by the management
and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot
be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of the
31
state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost . . .

Although the public trust began with a more limited focus during
an era of relatively weak environmental understanding, the trend
over time has been to expand protection to an equally broad array of
natural resources. Since the doctrine’s first application to navigable
beds, whose import to commerce is obvious, it has been extended to

27. See Kanner, supra note 9, at 62.
28. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970); see also V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S.
DAVIDSON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 1, § 2:3 (1972).
29. 8 Va. (4 Call) 441, 449-50 (Va. 1798).
30. Over the years, because the doctrine was used in relation to waterways, some confusion
arose about the public trust and its relation to riparians. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commonwealth, 47
S.E. 875, 882 (Va. 1904) (reconciling rights of the riparian with public rights); Groner v. Foster,
27 S.E. 493, 494 (Va. 1897) (emphasizing rights of riparians in navigable waters);
Commonwealth v. Garner, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 624, 655 (Va. 1846) (noting that navigable streams
were the property of the Commonwealth, held for the public benefit). Nonetheless, the
principle that government has a proprietary interest in natural resources survived. See, e.g.,
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1986) (noting the state’s regulatory authority over wild
game), overruled on other grounds by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979); Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (weighing the rights to shrimp in territorial waters).
31. 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892) (emphasis added).
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include state trusteeship over natural resources32 with little or no
commercial value, such as non-navigable waters33 and state parks.34
Additionally, although the public trust doctrine speaks in terms of
duties and not NRD, the nexus between resources that are recognized
as being held in trust by the state is their importance to the general
public, aesthetically as well as commercially. This importance
supersedes the natural resources’ potential value from exploitation by
any one individual. More recent cases have recognized that the trust
is active, not passive, and imposes a responsibility on states to
preserve and promote the trust corpus.35 Thus, a pattern has emerged
in which states are directed to take a more proactive approach to
fulfill their obligations and responsibilities with regard to the
protection of natural resources.
Recognizing that the state has an important interest in
conserving and protecting natural resources, the doctrine of parens
patriae allows the state (in its capacity as “trustee”) to bring suit to
protect those natural resources. This type of suit, recognized in many
36
states, allows the trustee (state) to sue to make the trust (natural
resources) whole, whether by means of restoration or compensation.
Despite the fact that many states have no case law directly addressing
a state’s parens patriae authority to sue, there is no evidence that any
state has deemed the principle of parens patriae not to be a part of the
state’s law.
Furthermore, many state constitutions, such as

32. The legal fiction of state ownership of natural resources was abandoned in Hughes as
being inconsistent with the Commerce Clause; however, the Supreme Court in that case
recognized the important interest at stake. The Supreme Court stated, “We consider the States’
interests in conservation and protection of wild animals as legitimate local purposes similar to
the States’ interests in protecting the health and safety of their citizens.” Hughes, 441 U.S. at
337.
33. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Ca. 1983), cert denied,
464 U.S. 977 (1983).
34. See Sax, supra note 28, at 485; Davenport v. Buffington, 97 F. 234, 238-39 (8th Cir.
1899); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 121 (Mass. 1966).
35. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 726-27; City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W.
820, 832 (Wis. 1927).
36. See, e.g., Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1098 (D. Me. 1973); Dep’t of
Natural Res. v. Amerada Hess, 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1066-67 (D. Md. 1972); California v. S.S.
Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 925 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Jersey Cent.
Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev’d on other grounds,
351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976); State v. Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio 1974); Dep’t of
Fisheries v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764, 766-67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
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Louisiana’s, impose upon the state a duty to protect the
environment.37
A somewhat analogous common law doctrine available to
redress NRD is the doctrine of public nuisance. Public nuisance is
defined as “an unreasonable interference with the rights common to
the general public;” it is “a significant interference with the public
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the
38
public convenience . . . “ Moreover, it is not necessary that an
individual actually be harmed.39 Monetary damages for public
nuisance, however, are not available.40 Depending on the jurisdiction,
public nuisance may be statutorily defined, but nonetheless may be
41
available at common law.
In a sense, the public trust doctrine and the public nuisance
doctrine operate under the same principle. Both protect interests of
the public in natural resources. The public trust doctrine protects
natural resources held for all. Public nuisance protects those held by
no one. In the case of United States v. Luce, the United States, as
operator of a quarantine station for immigrants waiting to enter the
country, brought a public nuisance action against a neighboring fish
factory. 42 The government sought an injunction against the factory to
abate foul smells that were making the quarantined individuals sick.43
The court granted relief, enjoining the nuisance, in spite of the
44
equitable right of the defendant.
From this case, one can see the interaction of the public trust
doctrine and public nuisance claims and their applicability to NRD
regarding the ability to file suit. In Luce, the court recognized that
the United States had a responsibility to alleviate nuisances affecting
37. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see also FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 4;
PA. CONST. art I, § 27.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979)
39. See Chicago v. Gunning Sys., 73 N.E. 1035, 1040-41 (Ill. 1905) (holding that the fact
that landowners had not been injured is not a defense).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821C cmt. a, (1979).
41. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871, 880 (Pa. 1974). The
State of Pennsylvania brought an action in equity to require the owner of closed mine to treat
acid mine drainage that was discharging from the mine. The state asserted claims based on
statutory and common law public nuisance. The court held that “[t]he third and fourth based
upon which the Commonwealth claims relief should be granted are the doctrines of statutory
and common law public nuisances. We find that relief may be granted under either of these
theories.” Id.
42. 141 F. 385, 390 (C.C.D. Del. 1905).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 422-23.
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the enjoyment of life of quarantined individuals under its care.45 This
responsibility is analogous to the responsibility of the government to
protect natural resources which are held under its care for the
common good. The Luce court also allowed the government to sue
prospectively to stop an activity that was harming those under its
46
care. Similarly, the government should be able to sue prospectively
to protect natural resources under its care from damage, or, if the
damage has already occurred, to sue on behalf of the trust to recover
compensation for injury.
2. Federal Trustees
Pursuant to the public trust doctrine, as first discussed by the
United States Supreme Court in Martin v. Waddell, “when the
[r]evolution took place, the people of each state became themselves
sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their
navigable waters, and the soils under them, for their own common
use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution to
the general government.”47 On the contrary, there is no inherent right
held by the federal government to act as trustee over natural
resources. Historically, to pursue NRD, the federal government has
been limited to actions permitted by legislative mandates that confer
upon it trustee status over natural resources.48 Despite this fact, the
federal government has managed to carve out a significant role as
trustee in the pursuit of NRD claims.
A variety of environmental laws confer trustee status upon the
49
federal government and its agencies. CERCLA, the Oil Pollution
50
Act (“OPA”) and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)51 all permit the
designation of both federal and state trustees to pursue NRD claims.
The statutes do not identify specific trustees; however, particular
trustees may be designated by other means. For example, Executive
52
53
Order 12580 and the amendment thereto designate certain federal
trustees to implement CERCLA, including the Departments and
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 389.
Id. at 422-23.
41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842).
Laura Rowley, NRD Trustees: To What Extent Are They Truly Trustees?, 28 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 459 (2001).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2) (2000).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b) (2000).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (2000).
52. Exec. Order No. 12580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923, 2923-24 (Jan. 23, 1987).
53. Exec. Order No. 13016, 61 Fed. Reg. 45871 (Aug. 28, 1996).
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Secretaries of State, Defense, Justice, Interior, Agriculture,
Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services, Transportation,
54
Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency.
One of the biggest problems associated with federal trustees is
that they are not bound by any specific rules or principles requiring
them to balance public interests - a fact that can give rise to actions by
federal trustees that are inconsistent with the fiduciary nature of
trusteeship. “Instead of holding federal statutory NRD trustees to a
55
strict fiduciary duty, courts have granted them agency deference.”
Such inconsistency with principles of trusteeship and fiduciary duties
is evidenced in cases where the trustee does not spend all monies
recovered for NRD to restore or recreate the injured natural
resource.56 While a trustee’s decision to not spend any monies
recovered on the restoration of the damaged natural resource clearly
violates the duties imposed upon federal agents as trustees, the most
minimal restoration efforts seem to “satisfy” a trustee’s fiduciary duty
57
despite the fact that the natural resource remains polluted. As a
result, the public, as the beneficiary of the trust, is deprived of the full
use and benefit of the natural resource and is left with no other
recourse since damages have already been recovered for the natural
resource’s injury.
3. Overlapping Authority
Since federal trusteeship is derived from a number of
overlapping federal statutes, more than one federal trustee will likely
be involved at a given site, and overlaps with state and Indian tribe
trustees frequently occur as well. The Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”), which amended CERCLA,
requires the EPA to notify trustees of possible natural resource
impacts and to coordinate its investigatory work with the trustees.58
Despite this fact, an initial obstacle in the pursuit of NRD is the

54. See also Trustees for Natural Resources, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.600-300.615 (2005).
55. Rowley, supra note 48, at 486.
56. “The best example of the futility in trying to identify where an NRD trustee has
violated the bounds of the statutory authority, and thus violated its fiduciary duty, is found in
the case of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. The Spill Trustee Council recovered nine hundred
million dollars from the settlement of a suit under the CERCLA and CWA NRD provisions.
Due to the magnitude of the disaster, the Spill Trustee Council used the money for a variety of
purposes, but it is unclear whether all the uses were for the end result of natural resource
restoration.” Id. at 487 (footnotes omitted).
57. Id. at 486.
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(2) (2000).
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coordination of trustee activities at a given site and the determination
of which trustee, if any, will be the lead.
The construction of federal environmental laws seems to indicate
that particular natural resources are the responsibility of the federal
government and other natural resources fall within the ambit of state
responsibility.59 However, the language utilized in these statutes fails
to clarify, for instance, whether natural resources located on
federally-owned property belong to the federal government or the
state wherein the property is located.60 One of the primary problems
with regard to multiple trustees is linking the contamination problem
of a particular resource to a particular trustee. For example, the
Department of the Interior (“DOI”) and the Department of
Commerce both have trustee status with regard to the protection of
migratory birds.61 As a result, a state may share trustee status over
natural resources when there has been an injury to migratory birds
stemming from the contamination of wetlands.62 Presumably, the
federal government may recover damage to the birds, while the state
trustee may recover damages for injury to the wetlands. However,
due to the principles prohibiting a double recovery for NRD63, the
two trustees are precluded from both recovering for the birds and the
wetlands.
While there are more attempts at coordination now, overlapping
trustee authority still inhibits action. At some sites, parties have been
unable to achieve prompt resolution of NRD issues at the time that
remedial issues are being settled with the EPA or a state, due to the
need for multiple trustee signoffs. The difficulty of resolving
overlapping jurisdictional issues is evidenced in United States v.
Asarco, Inc., in which the plaintiffs, the United States, the Coeur
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, and the State of Idaho, filed suit pursuant to
CERCLA and the CWA for injury to natural resources in northern

59. Marc G. Laverdiere, Natural Resource Damages: Temporary Sanctuary for Federal
Sovereign Immunity, 13 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 589, 591 (1994) (“For example, under CERCLA,
liability for damaging these resources is ‘to the United States Government and to any State for
natural resources within the State or belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or appertaining
to such State.’”)(footnotes omitted).
60. Id.
61. Thomas L. Eggert & Kathleen A. Chorostecki, Rusty Trustees and the Lost Pots of
Gold: Natural Resource Damage Trustee Coordination Under the Oil Pollution Act, 45 BAYLOR
L. REV. 291, 305 (1993).
62. Id.
63. E.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2000); OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(3) (2000).
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Idaho resulting from the defendants’ mining activities.64 A number of
defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that a settlement
agreement they had entered into with the State of Idaho precluded
recovery by the Tribe or the United States.65 The United States
argued that the State of Idaho did not have the authority to settle the
66
federal government’s claims regarding the same natural resources.
The court agreed with the United States, stating “CERCLA does not
give the state an exclusive right to bring a natural resource damages
action if the state files the first lawsuit claiming natural resource
damages and CERCLA does not prohibit more than one potential
trustee from bringing a natural resource damages action.”67 The
court’s decision that the record was insufficient to establish “the
scope of trusteeship of the plaintiff over the land and water at
issue”68 . . . and that “a more extensive factual record needs to be
reviewed regarding whether or not USA was in privity with the State
and/or the Tribe when the settlement agreements were entered with
the defendants”69 demonstrates that the occurrence of overlapping
70
trustee authority is not an issue that can easily be resolved.
The overlap of trustee authority also underscores the differences
by which various federal trustees and their state or Indian tribe
counterparts value NRD injuries and consider early dollar
settlements. All trustees will place a different value on the same
natural resource. For instance, natural resources may hold cultural or
spiritual worth for an Indian tribe that are not considered by the state
or federal government when valuing those resources for purposes of
calculating damages. Similarly, a state’s loss of revenue derived from
fishing licenses would not necessarily be considered by the federal
government when valuing the loss of a river to pollution.
4. Municipal and Local Trustees
Although the federal government, state government and Indian
tribes are empowered to recover NRD, prior to the SARA
Amendments, courts broadly read the NRD provision of the statute

64.
1998).
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Nos. CV 96-0122-N-EJL, CV 91-342-N-EJL, 1998 WL 1799392 (D. Idaho March 31,
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Id.
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as granting municipalities standing to pursue NRD claims.71
However, with the enactment of the Amendments, courts’
interpretation of ‘municipality’ drastically changed:
As originally enacted, CERCLA called for authorized
representatives of the state to act as natural resource trustees but
did not outline a procedure for appointing such trustees. Under
SARA, the governor of each state was charged with choosing an
official to act on the public’s behalf as trustee and to assess damage
to natural resources . . . [T]his change turned out to be significant to
the courts dealing with standing for municipalities. The courts
interpreted this trustee-appointing mechanism to be the only way a
72
municipality could be a natural resource trustee under CERCLA.

In Mayor and Council v. Klockner & Klockner, the municipality
filed suit under CERCLA for recovery of costs associated with the
73
The court
defendants’ contamination of groundwater wells.
ultimately determined that the SARA Amendments had “clarifie[d]”
the issue of standing with regard to CERCLA claims, stating that
“only a ‘state official,’ specifically appointed by the governor of the
state, may be an ‘authorized representative’ for purposes of bringing
an action to recover for natural resource damages. SARA thus
confirms Congress’ intent that Section 107(f) inure only to the benefit
of the states and not their political subdivisions.”74 Courts have
reached a similar finding as to the standing of a municipality when a
75
state statute is comparable or analogous to CERCLA.
Municipalities, however, are not completely deprived of standing in
the context of NRD. If a municipality wishes to recover NRD under
CERCLA or a similar state statute, it may still seek designation as
“trustee” by the state. In the alternative, municipalities may seek
NRD by asserting common law claims.76

71. Mayor and Bd of Aldermen of Boonton v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 667
(D.N.J. 1985).
72. Michael J. Wittke, Municipal Recovery of Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA,
23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 921, 929 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
73. 811 F. Supp. 1039, 1043 (D.N.J. 1993).
74. Id. at 1049; see also Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 472-473 (D.
Mass. 1991); City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials and Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 652 (N.D.
Ohio 1993); Borough of Sayreville v. Union Carbide Corp.,923 F. Supp. 671, 680-81 (D.N.J.
1996).
75. E.g., City of Portland v. Boeing Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1202-04 (D. Or. 2001);
Consol. Indianapolis v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 1:02-cv-1340-LJM-WTL, 2003 WL 22327832,
at *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2003).
76. Peter H. Lehner, Act Locally: Municipal Enforcement of Environmental Law, 12 STAN.
ENVTL. L. J. 50, 75 (1993).
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5. Citizen Suits
As noted earlier in the article, an individual who owns a natural
resource has standing as a property owner to file suit to recover for
any NRD. However, a private party’s ability to file suit to recover
damages for publicly owned natural resources is severely limited.
One of the only avenues by which a private citizen or entity may
pursue a claim for injury to publicly-owned natural resources is
77
through a citizen suit. At the federal level, citizen suits generally
occur in one of three contexts:
(1) suits brought by private citizens against persons alleged to be in
violation of a federal environmental law; (2) suits brought by
private citizens against the executive branch of the federal
government, typically the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), alleging that the federal government has failed to perform a
nondiscretionary duty in implementing an environmental law; or
(3) suits brought by private citizens against a federal agency
78
directed at the agency’s own polluting activities.

Because citizen suits are brought to vindicate rights held by the
public, private individuals who pursue claims under these provisions
do not have the same rights and relief as those afforded under private
causes of action.79 In addition, under the natural resource provisions
of federal laws, individual plaintiffs are precluded from recovering
80
NRD. Thus, individual plaintiffs may file a citizen suit to compel a
trustee to seek NRD; however, such plaintiffs may not recover NRD.

77. “All major environmental laws, specifically the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), as well as a host of less well known
environmental laws, such as the Toxic Substances Control Act, and the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act, contain essentially the same citizen suit provisions. They all trace their
origin to section 304 of the Clean Air Act.” Robert D. Snook, Environmental Citizen Suits and
Judicial Interpretation: First Time Tragedy, Second Time Farce, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 311,
313-314 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
78. Shay S. Scott, Combining Environmental Citizen Suits & Other Private Theories of
Recovery, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 369, 372-73 (1994) (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 378 (quoting Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages: Closing a
Gap in Federal Environmental Law, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 851, 870 (1989)) (“[Citizen suits]
thus do not include toxic tort suits for personal injury or property damage. They also do not
include private suits for the personal losses suffered when public resources are damaged; for
example, they do not include suits by fishermen when public fisheries are damaged by pollution.
While losses to people from pollution are important, they are different from the losses to the
environment itself.”).
80. See, e.g., In re Burbank Envtl. Litig., 42 F. Supp. 2d 976, 980 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Under
CERCLA, only natural resource trustees acting on behalf of the federal government, the state,
and certain Indian tribes may bring an action for damage to natural resources.”).
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Likewise, some state statutes also have similar citizen suit
provisions that permit individuals to file actions for environmental
contamination.
The New Jersey Environmental Rights Act
(“ERA”),81 for example, permits an individual to file an action against
“any other person alleged to be in violation of any statute, regulation
or ordinance which is designed to prevent or minimize pollution,
impairment or destruction of the environment” for injunctive or
equitable relief.82 The ERA, however, does not “confer any
substantive rights. . . . Rather, it grants private plaintiffs standing to
enforce other New Jersey environmental statutes ‘as an alternative to
inaction by the government which retains primary prosecutorial
83
responsibility.’” Under the ERA, a citizen may file suit to compel
the government to act to recover environmental damages, but the
citizen may not personally seek damages.84 Although citizen suits
may be a useful tool in compelling government action, they may not
be used to recover NRD - the power to bring actions to recover NRD
is vested solely with governmental trustees.
B. Causes of Action
1. State Statutory Causes of Action
In addition to NRD actions brought pursuant to federal laws,
states may also bring actions under state statutes. It follows that if a
state may sue on behalf of its natural resources, it may also legislate
to protect them or provide for compensation in the event they are lost
or destroyed. Accordingly, some forty-six states provide a public
cause of action for damage to natural resources.85

81. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:35A-1-2A:35A-14 (2006).
82. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:35A-4 (2006).
83. Mayor and Council v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. 1039, 1054 (D.N.J. 1993)
(quoting Superior Air Prods. Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 522 A.2d 1025, 1032 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1987)).
84. See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-4, 2A:35A-6.
85. See William S. Roush, Jr., Natural Resource Damage Claims, § 25.22 n.154, in 2 TOXIC
TORTS PRACTICE GUIDE (James T. O’Reilly ed., 2000). For example, in Puerto Rice v. S.S. Zoe
Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), a Puerto Rican statute provided the basis for assessing
damages for the discharge of oil. In that case, the circuit court stated, “where the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has thus legislatively authorized the bringing of suits for
environmental damages, and has earmarked funds so recovered to a special fund, such an action
must be construed as taking the place of any implied common law action the Commonwealth as
trustee, might have brought.” Id. at 672.
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These statutes vary widely in scope. New York’s, for example,
applies only to criminal violations;86 the laws of Maine and
87
Arguably the most
Massachusetts apply only to oil spills.
comprehensive of these statutes are those of California and
Minnesota. California’s statute provides liability for “any damage or
injury to the natural resources of the state, including, but not limited
to, marine and wildlife resources, caused by the discharge or leakage
of petroleum, fuel oil, or hazardous substances . . . .”88 Minnesota’s
statute holds any discharger of hazardous substances liable for “all
damages for any injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources
including the reasonable costs for assessing such injury, destruction,
89
or loss.”
A summary of these statutes indicates that most are aimed at
protecting the natural resources under the public trust. However,
when definitions of natural resources are too narrow, there are
resulting limitations on the recovery of NRD. Accordingly, these
statutes suffer some of the same problems as the public trust relative
to the scope of natural resources protected. Even the most
comprehensive statutes limit recovery to hazardous substance
damage. The issue of scope is one of the greatest limitations on the
recovery of NRD. Thus, the question then follows: how should this
problem be addressed?
New Jersey has managed to overcome the problem of scope by
defining natural resources broadly in its Spill Compensation and
Control Act (“Spill Act”).90 ‘“Natural resources’” are broadly defined
as “all land, fish, shellfish, wildlife, biota, air, waters and other such
resources owned, managed, held in trust or otherwise controlled by
the State.”91 Indeed, among the various state laws protecting natural
resources, New Jersey has one of the most potent.92 The New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection is authorized by statute to
commence civil actions for the “cost of restoration and replacement,
where practicable, of any natural resource damaged or destroyed by a

86. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2723 (McKinney 1981).
87. See Maine Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 38 § 551 (2001); Massachusetts Oil Spill Prevention and Response Trust Fund, MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 21M, § 8 (2002).
88. CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 293 (West Supp. 2001).
89. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.04 (1)(c) (West 2005).
90. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (1992).
91. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11b (1992).
92. See supra, text accompanying notes 82-85
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discharge.”93 By enacting the Spill Act, the New Jersey Legislature
created additional remedies to protect the environment and
compensate the public. The absolute liability provisions of the law
are especially noteworthy. Defining natural resources to encompass a
wide variety of resources has proven successful in addressing the
problem of scope with regard to any limitations upon NRD recovery.
2. Common Law Causes of Action
In addition to available statutory causes of action, state
governments may pursue common law causes of action to recover for
NRD.95 To protect a natural resource held in common, or to
compensate for its injuries, the state may sue in its trustee capacity.
In the case of natural resources held by no one, the state may sue to
enjoin under a public nuisance theory. Such causes of action are
especially useful to close the gap where federal statutes do not
provide adequate relief.96
Public nuisance actions, for example, were traditionally used to
obtain injunctive relief, enjoining certain behavior deemed to
constitute an “unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public.”97 Courts have increasingly held, however, that a state
may utilize public nuisance actions to recover response costs incurred
98
in the abatement of such a nuisance. If the state would like to
recover for a pecuniary loss arising from contamination of a natural
resource, however, it must allege a “special injury.”99 In New Mexico
v. General Electric Co., the court discussed what constitutes a “special
injury”:
93. N.J. STAT. ANN.58:10-23.11u.b(4) (1992).
95. For a more detailed discussion, see generally Kanner, supra note 9.
96. See James D. Lawlor, Right to Maintain Action to Enjoin Public Nuisance As Affected
by Existence of Pollution Control Agency, 60 A.L.R. 3d 665, 669 (1974) (until federal statutes
are more comprehensive, “public nuisance suits retain their vitality”). Federal statutes are
sometimes less desirable than other theories with regard to the recovery of NRD. CERCLA,
for example, has more defenses and involves a slow and rigid process, thus state law theories are
often better. Furthermore, a plaintiff may recover more damages bringing a common law claim,
rather than brining an action under CERCLA.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821B (1979).
98. See Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R.Co., 653 F.2d 1123, 1132 (7th Cir. 1980)
(permitting recovery of expenses incurred cleaning up groundwater contamination); New York
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043 n. 14 (noting in dicta that “New York law appears to
provide the State with restitution costs in a public nuisance action.”); Camden County Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245, 260 n.10 (D.N.J. 2000) (“This
Court agrees that for abatement of a public nuisance, New Jersey law permits cost recovery.”)
99. New Mexico v. General Electric Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1239 (D.N.M. 2004).

03__KANNER_ZIEGLER.DOC

138

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

2/6/2007 4:57 PM

[Vol. 17:119

To satisfy the “special injury” requirement in this case and establish
any entitlement to compensatory damages on their common-law
public nuisance claim, the Plaintiffs must show that the State has
suffered some discrete physical harm or pecuniary loss apart from
the more generalized injury to the public’s interest that results from
the public nuisance . . . Absent proof of some discrete “special
injury” to the State’s interest apart from the injury to the public’s
interest in unappropriated groundwater, Plaintiffs may be limited
100
to equitable relief seeking the abatement of the claimed nuisance.

New Jersey, in particular, has a rich common law tradition with
respect to the imposition of liability for environmental injuries and
101
The
the development of comprehensive and effective remedies.
common law has continued to develop despite the enactment of
statutory law on both the federal and state levels addressing
environmental liabilities.
State, Department of Environmental
Protection v. Ventron Corp. makes clear that common law remedies
remain available notwithstanding collateral or supplementary
statutory remedies.102 Ventron also provides a comprehensive
103
discussion of the history of New Jersey law on these remedies and
specifically notes that:
[T]oxic wastes are “abnormally dangerous,” and the disposal of
them, past or present, is an abnormally dangerous activity. We
recognize that one engaged in the disposing of toxic waste may be
performing an activity that is of some use to society. Nonetheless,
“the unavoidable risk of harm that is inherent in it requires that it
be carried on at his peril rather than at the expense of the innocent
104
person who suffers harm as a result of it.”

The Ventron decision set forth what has become a founding principle
in the development of environmental common law in New Jersey:
100. Id. at 1240-41; see also Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co. of
Am.., 271 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). The court held that “the State, acting in its
capacity as property owner, and not merely in its representative capacity, can seek damages as
well as injunctive relief . . .” Id. at 603. The court went on to determine that “the State does
have a legally cognizable interest in the ground waters affected here which suffice to support a
claim for damages.” Id. at 606.
101. New Jersey’s proactive and continuous use of the common law in NRD recovery
actions provides a valuable template for other states to utilize in their own NRD actions.
102. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983).
103. Id. at 157.
104. Id. at 160 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 520 cmt. h, at 39 (1977)). Cases
subsequent to Ventron have held that whether pollution activity is a basis for direct liability is to
be determined on a case-by-case approach following the Restatement principles. See, e.g., T &
E Industries Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 546 A.2d 570 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), aff’d as
modified, 587 A.2d 1249 (N.J. 1991); Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 497 A.2d 1310 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1985), rev’d, 517 A.2d 484 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (overruling trial court’s
denial of defendant’s motion for a right to trial by jury).
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“[t]hose who poison the land must pay for its cure.”105 In light of this
principle, the New Jersey courts have emphasized that their primary
concern in resolving environmental cases is to do so with underlying
considerations of “reasonableness, fairness and morality” rather than
the “formulary labels” which might be attached to particular causes of
106
action. In addition to strict liability, other traditional tort theories
remain viable. Nuisance,107 trespass,108 negligence,109 and fraud110 have
all been successfully asserted in New Jersey environmental cases.
Punitive damages are available in environmental actions involving
deliberate acts or omissions committed with the knowledge of a high
degree of probability of harm, reckless indifference to consequences,
or where there has been “such a conscious and deliberate disregard of
the rights of others that his conduct may be called willful or
wanton.”111 Indeed, state statutory limitations on the availability of
punitive damages have specifically excluded “environmental
112
tort[s].”
C. Causation
When a common law claim for NRD is brought, a plaintiff must
prove causation with respect to the claim as required by the common
law.113 When a trustee brings NRD claims under federal legislation,
the degree of causation must be gleaned from the statute. If the
statute does not specify the standard of proof necessary for causation,
it is left to the courts to determine what is required. In both cases,
causation is not an especially difficult hurdle. The causation
requirement ensures that the conduct complained of is appropriately
linked to the wrong claimed - the natural resource injury, nuisance, or
trespass.
CERCLA, for example, does not specify the standard of proof
necessary for showing that a particular discharge or release caused a
105. Ventron, 468 A.2d at 160.
106. T & E Industries Inc., 546 A.2d at 577(quoting Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., Thiokol
Chem. Corp., 181 A.2d 487 (N.J. 1962)); Kenney, 497 A.2d at 1324.
107. Ventron, 468 A.2d at 157-58, overruling Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1876); But see Kenney, 497 A.2d at 1324.
108. State, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 158 (N.J. 1983).
109. Kenney, 497 A.2d at 1324, 28.
110. Ventron, 468 A.2d at 166.
111. Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 497 A.2d 1310, 1323 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (quoting
WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, TORTS (5th ed. 1984), § 2 at 9-10).
112. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:58C-6 (2000).
113. Kanner, supra note 9 at 59.
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particular injury.
Under §107(a)(4)(c), NRD trustees seeking
restoration must prove injury to natural resources “resulting from” a
release of a hazardous substance. Courts have generally required
only a minimal connection between the responsible party and the
response costs incurred in connection with a release.114
In Ohio v. Department of Interior, the D.C. Circuit held that
CERCLA was ambiguous as to the standard of causation to be
applied in determining whether a hazardous substance release caused
a particular injury.115 The court concluded that DOI’s position that
the traditional common law standard of causation should be applied
116
Consequently, trustees
was a permissible reading of the statute.
must be able to meet traditional causation standards when showing
that a particular spill or release caused or, at the very least, was a
“contributing factor” to a particular injury.117
In National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of
Interior, the court stated “CERCLA is ambiguous on the precise
question of what standard of proof is required to demonstrate that
natural resource injuries were caused by, or ‘resulting from,’ a
118
The same court stated in Kennecott Utah
particular release.”
Copper Corp. v. Department of Interior that “[w]hile the statutory
language requires some causal connection between the element of
damages and the injury - the damages must be ‘for’ an injury
‘resulting from a release of oil or a hazardous substance’ - Congress
has not specified precisely what that causal relationship should be.” 119
This may require proof of a causal link between the defendant’s
120
release and the injured resource.
121
In Castaic Lake Water Agency v. Whittaker Corp., the district
court held that where perchlorate contamination originated at one
site and allegedly migrated to the wells owned by the plaintiff water

114. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir.
1989).
115. 880 F.2d 432, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1124 (D. Idaho
2003) (requiring use of “contributing factor” causation test in NRD action by Native American
tribe and United States against mining companies). In Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the court
concluded that volumetric tailings production provided a sufficiently reasonable basis for
apportionment to defeat joint and several liability. Id. at 1120-21.
118. 134 F.3d 1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d at 472).
119. 88 F.3d 1191, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
120. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D. Idaho 1986).
121. 272 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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providers at a different site, plaintiffs can satisfy their burden of
production with respect to CERCLA causation by: (1) identifying
perchlorate at their site; (2) identifying perchlorate at defendant’s
site; and, (3) providing “evidence of a plausible migration pathway by
which the contaminant could have traveled from the defendant’s
122
facility to the plaintiff’s site.”
Where the plaintiffs satisfy this
burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to offer evidence
“disproving causation.”123
In Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco Inc., the district court applied
a “contributing factor” causation test for the recovery of NRD.124
That is, where hazardous waste from multiple defendants has
commingled, the plaintiff trustee has the burden of proving that each
defendant’s release is a more than a de minimis “contributing factor”
125
to the natural resource injuries alleged by the trustee.
One last causation burden exists for trustees in the context of
assessing NRD.
The DOI’s NRD assessment (“NRDA”)
126
regulations require that trustees determine the baseline condition of
the injured resource and then compare that baseline with the injured
127
“Baseline” is defined
status of the resource to quantify injury.
under the DOI NRDA regulations as “the condition or conditions
that would have existed at the assessment area had the discharge of oil
or release under investigation not occurred.”128 While the trustee has
the burden of determining baseline under the NRDA regulations,
defendants should ensure that the trustee is apprised of all
appropriate conditions or factors impacting the resource other than
the release of the hazardous substances at issue.
These cases demonstrate a key issue with regard to causation ultimately, causation is not difficult to prove. Furthermore, even if
the contamination is mingled between multiple PRPs, it will not be
difficult to show causation sufficient to prevail in a suit for NRD.
These cases also show the potential interplay of substantive law and
case management issues. For example, it should be sufficient to
prove wrongful misconduct and some causation so as to establish the

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 1066.
Id.
280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1114 (D. Idaho 2003).
Id. at 1124.
43 C.F.R. § 11 (2005).
43 C.F.R. § 11.83 (2005).
43 C.F.R. § 11.14(e) (2005) (emphasis added).
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liability of a responsible party and thereby shift the cost of a
comprehensive NRDA to the wrongdoer as opposed to the trustee.
D. Injury
A natural resource injury is “any adverse change or impact of a
discharge on a natural resource or impairment of natural resource
services, whether direct or indirect, long-term or short-term, and
includes the partial or complete destruction or loss of the natural
129
resource.”
Clarity with regard to assertion of the type of injury to a natural
resource is an essential component of bringing a successful claim for
NRD. If a plaintiff does not clearly and specifically define and
quantify the nature of the injury, there is a significant risk that a claim
for NRD will fail. In New Mexico v. General Electric Co., the
plaintiffs were prevented from recovering NRD due to their failure to
clearly and accurately set forth the nature of the injuries they
130
Plaintiffs asserted a claim for the loss of drinking water
claimed.
services as a result of chemical contamination emanating from the
defendants’ operations.131 The court held that the drinking water
standards promulgated by the New Mexico Water Quality Control
Commission (“NMWQCC”) should be used to determine if there was
an injury-the loss of drinking water services.132 Under these rules,
water must only meet the requisite standards with regard to the level
of contaminants; the water need not be pristine to qualify as
potable.133 The plaintiffs, however, contended that the drinking water
134
standards were not the proper means of identifying the injury. The
court disagreed, stating:
In effect, then, Plaintiffs now argue two different theories of injury:
(1) that “[t]he standard for drinking water quality for the
groundwater involved in this lawsuit is the more stringent
NMWQCC health-based toxic pollutant standard”; and (2) that
“the groundwater and aquifer will remain injured unless and until it
is restored to its pre-contaminated condition.”
These two
assertions, often made together, are not wholly congruent.
....

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Kanner, supra note 16, at 98.
335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1212 (D.N.M. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 1210.
Id.
Id.

03__KANNER_ZIEGLER.DOC

Fall 2006]

2/6/2007 4:57 PM

NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE

143

. . . In this case, it may well be that the State of New Mexico has
suffered an injury to its interest in the groundwater underlying the
South Valley Site, notwithstanding the fact that much of the
groundwater meets the New Mexico drinking water standards, but
it may be that the injury is not the total and permanent loss of
drinking water services that Plaintiffs now assert.
To date, however, Plaintiffs have proffered no significant probative
evidence of any diminution in value of the groundwater, measured
by the difference between its current condition and its formerly
pristine state, apart from the alleged loss of drinking water services.
No expert witness has testified as to the economic value of water
that may prove to be drinkable, but still not pristine.
. . . Plaintiffs’ own characterization of their alleged injury selects the
legal standard to be applied to measure the existence and extent of
that injury. Drinkability does not equate with pristine purity under
New Mexico law, and the court remains convinced that a loss of
drinking water services must be measured by applying New Mexico
135
drinking water standards.

What this case demonstrates is that quantification of the type of
natural resource injury is essential to a successful recovery. The
plaintiffs may have succeeded had they considered what loss of use
136
It also
involves before asserting it as the primary injury.
demonstrates that NRD claims for injury relating solely to loss of use
are generally weaker and have a lower possibility of success then a
claim for restoration where there is an injury by mere virtue of the
existence of contaminants in the natural resource.
One of the most critical factors in recovering NRD is the distinct
nature and extent of the injury and what that means for damages. It
must be remembered that proving how a natural resource has been
injured is not the same as proving what amount of damages should be
recoverable.

135. Id. at 1211-12 (footnotes omitted).
136. Credibility with regard to NRD claims is essential, especially when non-traditional
injuries are being asserted. “Before a lawyer can persuade a jury or any fact-finder, it is
necessary to start at the beginning and decide what the case is about. Surprisingly, many
lawyers never really know this fact, or they (or their experts) change their game plan so often
that it seems they have no plan. . . . In short, the case should be as planned as possible before
going to court.” ALLAN KANNER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORT TRIALS § 1.01 (2d ed.
2004).

03__KANNER_ZIEGLER.DOC

144

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

2/6/2007 4:57 PM

[Vol. 17:119

E. Damages
1. Generally
The method and manner of quantifying damages to a natural
resource is perhaps the greatest challenge for NRD litigation, both
137
presently and in the future. “Damage is a legal concept determining
what a liable party has to do or pay to make the public or
138
In
environment whole for the injuries to natural resources.”
addition, damages help to deter future misconduct.139 NRD is defined
by CERCLA as the compensation for the “[i]njury to, destruction of,
or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of
assessing such injury.”140 CERCLA’s congressional hearings are filled
with testimony that the NRD provisions should measure society’s full
loss from damaged or destroyed natural resources, not just damages
capable of market valuation.141 This is fundamental to deterring
142
wrongful conduct. This broader concept is reflected in § 301(c)(2)
of CERCLA, which requires damage assessment procedures to
identify the extent of short- and long-term, direct and indirect injury,
destruction, or loss.143
Thus, Congress explicitly stated that
recoverable injuries were not limited solely to use or market value
but also indirect injury (for example, the intrinsic value of a natural
resource). Comments also urged that the legislation shift the burden
of any such losses from victims to responsible parties, consistent with
concepts of strict liability.144 If a response action fails to provide a
complete and whole remedy for injury to a natural resource, damages
137. Because of the complex nature of damages, the damages phase may be bifurcated from
the rest of the trial. “Bifurcation of an action is appropriate where . . . there are complicated
issues of liability that must be resolved prior to the assessment of damages.” Witherbee v.
Honeywell, Inc., 151 F.R.D. 27, 29 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
138. See Kanner, supra note 16, at 104.
139. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992) (quoting San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)) (“[t]he obligation to pay
compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and
controlling policy.”).
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(6), 9607(a)(4)(C) (2000).
141. See, e.g., Oil and Hazardous Substances Liability and Oil Pollution Liability: Excerpts
from Hearings on H.R. 29 and H.R. 85 Before the Subcomm. On Coast Guard and Navigation
of the House Comm. On Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1979)
(statement of James N. Barnes, Center for Law and Social Reform).
142. See generally Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Measuring Loss of Use Damages in Natural
Resource Damage Actions, 30 COLUMBIA J. ENVTL. L. 417 (2005).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (2000).
144. Supra note 141, at 213, 214, n. 23 (statement of Sarah Chasis, National Advisory
Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere).
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may be recovered for such.145 Any recovery had by a trustee for NRD
“must be used to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent” of the
146
injured natural resources.
There are three primary categories of damages for a trustee to
consider: restoration, compensatory restoration, and assessment and
other transaction costs.
a. Restoration
Restoration, or primary restoration costs, involves the cost of any
action, or combination of actions, to restore, rehabilitate, replace, or
acquire the equivalent of the injured natural resources and services in
a “baseline state.”147 Essentially, this is the cost of restoration of the
resource to its pre-damage condition, taking into account natural
recovery. Replacement can be a viable action in this context, so long
as the citizens of a state do not otherwise suffer. For instance,
replacing a North Louisiana greenspace with an equivalent one in
South Louisiana does little to assuage the damage to residents of
North Louisiana. A state should have the right to full restoration of
natural resources, however, even if it will ultimately be more costly
than replacement. This idea is consistent with the notion that there is
a preference for complete restoration of the damaged natural
resource, rather than the creation of an entirely new one.
b. Compensatory Restoration
In addition, there are use and non-use148 compensatory
restoration values that must be repaid. These damages involve the
provision of additional restoration of injured resources to compensate
for lost natural resource functions and services from the time of
contamination through the time the resource is restored.149
Compensatory restoration is not directly defined in the statutory
language of the OPA and CERCLA, although it is discussed in the
regulations developed under each of these statutes.
The OPA regulations, promulgated by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) define restoration as “any
action or combination of actions, to restore, rehabilitate, replace or

145. See Kanner, supra note 16, at 102.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2000).
147. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83 (2005).
148. “Nonuse values are values people may hold for natural resource services that are
independent of any anticipated use of the resource.” William H. Desvousges & Janet C. Lutz,
Compensatory Restoration: Economic Principles and Practice, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 411, 412 (2000).
149. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. § 11.83 (2005).
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acquire the equivalent of injured natural resources and services.”
These same regulations identify “compensatory restoration” as
included within restoration generally and define it as “action(s)
taken to make the environment and the public whole for services
losses that occur from the date of the incident until recovery of the
150
injured natural resources.”

Due consideration must be given to discern the unique value of the
natural resources of the state. Natural resources are more than mere
property claims. They are inextricably interwoven into the fabric of
our ecology and the quality of our lives as we steward them from one
generation of our citizens to the next. Natural resources must be
valued both presently and prospectively. If these prospective
consequences may, in reasonable probability, be expected to flow
from the past harm, the state is entitled to be paid for them.151 Loss of
use, or benefit to polluter, both damage the people during the period
of impairment and restoration. These damages should be equal to the
benefit derived or savings to the parties damaging the natural
resource. If, for instance, a natural resource was damaged by one
thousand dollars to save or make one million dollars, this should be
recaptured to the extent not otherwise covered. This item of damages
forces the wrongdoer to internalize the costs of pollution by usage fee
or unjust enrichment.152
c. Costs
Another important measure of damages is the assessment and
other transaction costs. These damages include all costs, expenses
and fees incurred by the state, including due diligence and prelitigation costs and attorney fees, in recovering the foregoing.153 Also
included is the time value of money.154 Compensation for transaction

150. See Kanner, supra note 16, at 103 (citations omitted).
151. See Coll v. Sherry, 148 A.2d 481, 486 (N.J. 1959) (stating that “[i]f the prospective
consequences may, in reasonable probability, be expect to flow from the past harm, plaintiff is
entitled to be indemnified for them” when recovering damages for a tortuous personal injury).
152. See Allan Kanner, Unjust Enrichment in Environmental Litigation, 20 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 111, 112 (2005).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(4) (2000).
154. See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. § 11.84 (2001). Section
9607(b)(4)(C) provides that responsible parties may be held liable for “damages for injury to,
destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such
injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.” However, under section 9607(f), a
trustee may not recover for natural resource losses occurring before the date of CERCLA’s
enactment (December 11, 1980), or for losses identified in an environmental impact assessment,
which are deemed to be authorized by permit or license. Likewise, under section 9607(c), the
trustee may not recover in excess of $50 million unless a showing is made that the release
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costs means full restoration. It is important to note that costs are not
necessarily available under non-CERCLA state law theories unless
equity is involved.
2. Valuation
There are numerous approaches to determining value for NRD.
One example is the valuation approach of the DOI.155 While it seeks
restoration as its goal, the DOI program sometimes works in the
opposite direction, for example, when a defendant is permitted to
purchase a cheaper replacement rather than restore the natural
resource. Like many tort cases, it places an emphasis on assessing
damage in a monetary framework, as opposed to restoration, as the
means to making the public whole, and thus is perceived by the
regulated community to be punitive rather than productive.156
On the other hand is the more industry-friendly approach of
NOAA. Under the NOAA approach, NRD focuses on remediation
157
of harm rather than monetization of claims. In addition, it utilizes
an open process that requires public comment, and encourages
cooperation with responsible parties rather than litigation. The
NOAA regime is “restoration based,” that is, it establishes
restoration of the damaged natural resources as the goal,158 and
provides the agency and the responsible party a great deal of
flexibility to develop a plan to move forward and achieve it. In
general, there is more room for disagreement regarding valuation of
159
loss of use claims.

resulted from willful misconduct or willful negligence, or from a violation of federal safety or
operating standards.
155. Under the DOI rules, the measure of damages “is the cost of restoration or
replacement of the damaged resource. Additionally, compensable value, the value of the lost
services of the resource during the time period from the injury until the baseline conditions have
been returned, is available for recovery at the discretion of the trustee. The trustee can chose
between several valuation methods for estimating compensable value, including market
valuation, appraisal, factor income, travel cost, hedonic pricing, unit value, contingent valuation,
or other suitable valuation methods. The use of contingent valuation for measuring option and
existence value is available only when the trustee determines there are no relevant use values.”
James Peck, Measuring Justice for Nature: : Issues in Evaluating and Litigating Natural Resource
Damages, 14 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 275, 301 (1999).
156. See id. at 281.
157. See Kanner, supra note 16, at 103-04.
158. Id. at 103.
159. See Kanner & Nagy, supra note 142.
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F. Defenses
Because the pursuit of NRD is relatively new territory, one of
the areas with the greatest potential for development and change is
the defenses to liability. As NRD cases are more frequently litigated,
new, creative, and complex defenses will be asserted. Plaintiffs can
anticipate a variety of defenses that may be offered by defendants in
NRD cases. A defendant may argue, for example, that if a
groundwater resource is not currently being used by the public, then
there has been no harm suffered if it is contaminated. Defendants
may also contest liability when there are multiple polluters of a single
resource, thereby making it difficult to attribute particular
contamination to a specific source. Furthermore, a defendant may
argue that a remedy is not reasonable or proportionate to the harm,
for example, when restoration costs far exceed the market value of
the property.
1. Statutory Defenses
Most federal environmental statutes specifically enumerate
defenses to liability available to a defendant in NRD actions.
CERCLA, for example, provides that a person otherwise liable for
contamination will not be liable in the event the damages resulting
from the release or threat of release were caused “solely by-(1) an act
of God; (2) an act of war; (3) [or] an act or omission of a third
160
161
162
party. . . .” Similar provisions are found in the CWA and OPA
160. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000).
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (2000) (“Except where an owner or operator can prove that a
discharge was caused solely by (A) an act of God, (B) an act of war, (C) negligence on the part
of the United States Government, or (D) an act or omission of a third party without regard to
whether any such act or omission was or was not negligence . . . such owner or operator of any
vessel from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged . . . shall . . . be liable to the United
States Government for the actual costs incurred under subsection (c) of this section for the
removal of such oil or substance by the United States Government . . .”). Interpreting these
provisions:
“CERLCA’s use of the word ‘omission’ in the phrase ‘act or omission’ of a third party
suggests that the conduct of the third party must be wrongful. After all, an omission
can only exist in relation to a duty to act. The Clean Water Act defense, however,
expressly provides that the act or omission of the third party need not be negligent to
qualify as the sole cause. The defense is available ‘without regard to whether any such
act or omission was or was not negligent.’ One significant difference between the third
party defense of the Clean Water Act and CERCLA is that the CERCLA does not
contain this exception, suggesting perhaps that one way to distinguish the causation of
the defendant and the third party is that the defendant must prove that the third
party’s conduct was somehow wrongful.”
James R. MacAyeal, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act: The Correct Paradigm of Strict Liability and the Problem of Individual Causation, 18 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 217, 312-13 (2000/2001).
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Because of their limited application, however, these “formal”
defenses are rarely successful. “Informal defenses,” such as those
described below provide defendants with the opportunity to more
successfully contest liability.
2. Applicability of CERCLA
One important issue with regard to defenses to CERCLA is the
applicability of the statute. CERCLA does not apply retroactively.
Section 107(f)(1) of CERCLA states “[t]here shall be no recovery . . .
where such damages and the release of hazardous substance from
which such damages regulated have occurred wholly before
December 11, 1980 [enactment day of CERCLA].”163 Thus, if NRD
occurred on or before December 11, 1980, a defendant is not liable
164
under CERCLA. “[W]here damages are readily divisible [between
pre and post-enactment damages], the sovereigns cannot recover for
such damages incurred prior to the enactment . . . In cases where the
natural resource damages are not divisible and the damages or
releases that caused the damages continue post-enactment, the
sovereigns can recover for such non-divisible damages in their
entirety.”165
In Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., the United States and the
Coeur d’Alene Tribe sought to recover NRD associated with releases
166
The defendants argued that no hazardous
of mine wastes.
substance releases had occurred after CERCLA’s enactment in 1980,
and no post enactment damages had occurred because environmental
conditions in the Coeur d’Alene Basin had continuously improved.167
The trustees argued that the contaminants continued to be released
and re-released, and maintained that the critical date, for purposes of
CERCLA, is when an injury is quantified.168

162. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2000) (“A responsible party is not liable for removal costs or
damages under section 2702 of this title if the responsible party establishes, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the discharge or substantial threat of a discharge of oil and the resulting
damages or removal costs were caused solely by-(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act
or omission of a third party . . . .”).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) 2000.
164. United States v. Reilly Tar and Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1120 (D. Minn. 1982).
165. In re Acushnet River and New Bedford Harbor Proceeding, 716 F. Supp. 676, 685-86
(D. Mass. 1989).
166. 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1114 (D. Idaho 2003).
167. Id.
168. Id.
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The court ruled that CERCLA’s “wholly before” limitation did
not bar the plaintiffs from recovery.169 The court found that “passive
migration caused by leaching from variations in low and high water is
170
a post-enactment release under CERCLA.” Furthermore, the court
concluded that the “passive movement and migration of hazardous
substances by mother nature (no human action assisting in the
movement) is still a ‘release’ for purposes of CERCLA in this case.”171
The court then relied on Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., v. Pintlar
172
and In re Acushnet River and New Bedford Harbor
Corp.,
Proceedings,173 to conclude that “damages” for purposes of the
“wholly before” limitation are defined as the “monetary
174
The court held that “damages
quantification of the injury.”
occurred post-enactment when the federal government and Tribe
began studying the ‘injury’ caused by the mining industry and how to
clean up the injury to natural resources.”175 Distinguishing the Ninth
Circuit’s 2002 en banc decision in Carson Harbor,176 the court ruled
that the defendants’ releases did not occur “wholly before” 1980
because the continued, post-enactment passive migration of the
contaminants constituted a “release” or “re-release” under the
statute.177 The district court further held that even if all of the
defendants’ releases occurred before 1980, the plaintiffs’ claim would
still not be barred by section 9607(f) because “the damages associated
with such releases occurred post-enactment . . . the statute only
excuses liability if the release and the damages both occur preenactment.”178
In Montana v. Atlantic Richfield Co., Judge Haddon reached the
179
opposite conclusion on CERCLA’s “wholly before” limitation.
Montana brought an NRD action against Atlantic Richfield seeking
to recover restoration costs at “upland areas” in the Clark Fork River
Basin.180 The court rejected the theory that damages do not occur
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 1113-14.
Id. at 1113
Id.
948 F. 2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1991).
716 F. Supp. 676, 681 (D. Mass. 1989).
Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Ascaro, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1114 (D. Idaho 2003).
Id.
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp, 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
Coeur d’Alene, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
Id. at 1114.
Montana v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1245 (D. Mont. 2003).
Id. at 1239.
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until expenses are incurred or costs are quantified, finding that such a
theory is “unpersuasive” and would render the “wholly before”
181
Instead, the court held that
limitation in the statute meaningless.
“damages accrue or occur, including restoration costs, when the
underlying injury occurs.”182 The court barred the state of Montana’s
claim for restoration cost damages because such damages occurred
183
wholly before December 11, 1980.
3. NRD and Site Remediation are the Same
A defendant may also attempt to defend against its liability by
taking advantage of the fact that most judges do not possess a
significant degree of sophistication with regard to environmental
issues. In the event a judge is not familiar with this highly specialized
area of law, a defendant may attempt to blur the distinction between
costs associated with site remediation and the recovery of NRD.
There is, however, a clear distinction between the goals of
remediation and those for the recovery of NRD. With regard to site
remediation, a PRP is responsible for the costs associated with the
remediation of the pollution. NRD is designed to compensate the
public for the damage to its natural resources and the loss of use
resulting from the resource’s contamination.
In an effort to avoid the payment of damages for the destruction
of natural resources, a defendant may argue that the site remediation
must be completed before NRD can be assessed. While a defendant
engages in countless site assessments and feasibility studies, the loss
of use of the natural resource and the continued degradation of the
site is being ignored.
Consequently, a defendant is actually
attempting to postpone a realization of its liability under the guise of
“action.” However, as discussed earlier, site remediation can last for
years without any actual cleanup occurring.184
A defendant may argue that since it is engaged in site
remediation, a cost-benefit analysis, which is often used in the context
of site remediation, is appropriate for the assessment of NRD.
However, no court has ever used a cost-benefit analysis to value
NRD. If a cost-benefit analysis is used to determine the amount of
money that is recoverable for NRD, the public will almost never be

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 1243-44.
Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1245.
See Kanner, supra note 12.

03__KANNER_ZIEGLER.DOC

152

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

2/6/2007 4:57 PM

[Vol. 17:119

fully restored because the nonmonetary value of the natural resources
cannot be fully and fairly calculated.
4. Preemption of Federal Law
When a trustee files a claim for NRD pursuant to state law, one
common defense that a defendant may assert is that the law on which
the claim is based is preempted by federal law. Generally, there are
three ways in which a state law may be preempted by federal law.
First, Congress can explicitly state in a federal statute that it preempts
185
Second, state law that legislates in an area that Congress
state law.
has exclusively reserved to the federal government will be
186
Third, state law will also be preempted if it conflicts
preempted.
with federal law.187 “The presumption is that powers historically
belonging to the states are not preempted by federal legislation unless
that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”188 The fact that
the states have historically been entrusted with the protection of
natural resources lends credence to the argument that federal laws
will rarely preempt state law claims for NRD.
In In re Allied Towing Corp., a party who spilled oil into the
Chesapeake Bay filed a complaint seeking limitation of liability
189
pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act and § 1321(f) of the
190
CWA. The United States responded by filing a claim for cleanup
costs and the State of Virginia also responded by filing a claim
seeking civil penalties, cleanup costs and damages for injury to
natural resources.191 The court held that federal law does not
supersede a valid exercise of a state’s police power unless there is a
specific manifestation of Congress’ intent to preempt state law.192
With respect to the interaction between the CWA and Virginia state
statutes, the court stated:
Nothing in this scheme [of the CWA], however, conflicts with or
otherwise preempts any state statute, such as Virginia’s, imposing
liability on the owner or operator of any vessel which illegally
discharges oil, nor does it limit the amount of liability. Similarly,

185.
1993).
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Attorney General v. Consumers Power Co., 508 N.W.2d 901, 902 ( Mich. Ct. App.
Id.
Id.
Id.
46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (repealed 1976).
In re Allied Towing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 398, 400 (E.D. Va. 1979).
Id.
Id. at 401.
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nothing in the FWPCA precludes the states from imposing civil
penalties upon vessel owners or operators who violate state statutes
by discharging oil illegally. It merely provides the states with an
alternative federal remedy which assures that, either through the
action and expenditure of the state or Federal Government, the
193
natural resources of this country will be preserved.”

Preemption of state law often arises in the context of NRD when
the resource that has been injured is a navigable body of water, thus
seemingly invoking admiralty and maritime issues. However, courts
have consistently held that state actions are not preempted by federal
law when state law does not conflict with federal law and Congress
has not specifically legislated the issue.194 In general, federal
environmental statutes are not enacted to supplant state statutory and
common law causes of action; rather, they are meant to be
supplements to ensure that trustees have adequate means by which
they may seek and recover NRD.
5. Scope of the Public Trust Doctrine
When NRD claims are brought pursuant to the public trust
doctrine, it is highly likely that a defendant will contest the scope of
the doctrine’s application. As noted in section II.A.1, infra, in early
United States cases, the public trust doctrine was applied to suits
involving the protection of navigable waters.195 The doctrine has
evolved over time, however, and has been expanded to include the
protection of not only navigable waters, but other resources,
including wildlife196 and beaches.197 Some states have even extended
the doctrine to include recreational activities such as sailing,
swimming, hunting and the enjoyment of scenic and aesthetic
beauty.198

193. Id. at 403.
194. See, e.g., In re Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 631 (1st Cir. 1994)
(holding that the Rhode Island Environmental Injury Compensation act that permits state law
remedies for damage resulting from oil pollution is not preempted by federal maritime law); In
re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 900 F. Supp. 697, 703 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding that New Jersey’s
common law with respect to the recovery of purely economic losses “is not preempted as
impermissibly prejudicing federal maritime law); But see Maryland v. Kellum, 51 F.3d 1220,
1228 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that federal law preempts state natural resources code when it
alters the rights and liabilities afforded to the parties under federal maritime law).
195. For a more complete discussion of the evolution of the public trust doctrine, see
generally Kanner, supra note 9.
196. In re Steuart Transp., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980).
197. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972).
198. Hixon v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 146 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Wis. 1966).
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Despite the fact that there is a trend toward expansion, those
who oppose an extension of the doctrine contend that the inclusion of
other resources is not consistent with the historic foundation of the
doctrine.199 A prime example of this debate is the issue of whether
groundwater should be protected by the public trust doctrine.
The vital role groundwater plays in the survival and development
of the United States is rapidly emerging as an important and visible
issue in the nation’s consciousness.
Groundwater supplies
approximately ninety-six percent of the water in the United States.200
Moreover, at least fifty percent “of the domestic water used in the
201
In some areas,
United States is derived from groundwater.”
populations are one hundred percent reliant on groundwater.202 Thus,
groundwater is one of the nation’s most precious natural resources.
Opponents to the extension of the public trust doctrine assert
that the traditional application of the public trust doctrine extended
only to surface water;203 however, advances in science and technology
demonstrate that there is a significant interrelationship between
ground and surface water.204 It follows from this fact and basic
hydrogeologic concepts that contamination of surface water can
205
This
ultimately lead to the contamination of groundwater.
understanding, coupled with the knowledge that the preservation of
groundwater has become crucial to the survival of our communities,
has paved the way for groundwater’s inclusion within the bounds of
the public trust doctrine.206
Additionally, it can be argued that the reason the public trust was
first applied to navigable waters, to foster the development of early
American settlements, is precisely the same reason that the public
trust doctrine should now encompass the protection of groundwater.
Because the public trust doctrine “should not be considered fixed or
static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing

199. See Kanner, supra note 9, at 83..
200. Albert P. Barker & Richard B. Burleigh, Agricultural Chemicals and Groundwater
Protection: Navigating the Complex Web of Regulatory Controls, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 443, 449
(1994).
201. Id.
202. Blake Johnston et al., Groundwater in the West, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 328, 335
(2004).
203. Kanner, supra note 9, at 83.
204. Id. at 83, 85-86.
205. Id. at 85.
206. See Id. at 84-86.
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conditions and the needs of the public it was created to benefit,”207 the
scope of the doctrine should remain broad and should extend to all
resources that provide some benefit to the public, especially when
basic human survival is dependent on such a resource.
6. Government Contractor Defense
One of the greatest ironies when considering NRD is the fact
that pollution frequently emanates from facilities that provide
services or products that have significant value or are necessary to our
society for purposes of economics and development. The pollution
associated with these products or services may be characterized by
polluters as a sort of “necessary evil.”208 Indeed, some of these
services and products required by the general public are also required
by the government. A government’s need for such products or
services is especially critical, for example, when the country is
engaged in a war. Furthermore, it has often been the case that such
products and services are commissioned or rationed expressly by the
government for use by the military during such times.
When the government has requisitioned services or products
from a defendant, a defendant might assert a government contractor
defense to liability stemming from actions related to the provision of
209
these services or products. This defense is based on the notion that
when a PRP is compelled to provide services or products for the
United States, any injury or damage arising as a result of performance
of that obligation is excusable. The government contractor defense is

207. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972).
208. This characterization of pollution provokes the question whether the evil was truly
unavoidable or necessary. There is a predisposition to assume that polluters “did not know any
better” when polluting the environment prior to the enactment of environmental regulations.
The reality, however, is that the notion of “necessary evil” cannot be taken at face value.
Polluters must be held accountable for all of their actions, whether environmental regulations
existed at the time of pollution or not.
209. Courts have held that this is not a viable third party defense with respect to CERCLA.
See, e.g.,, United States v. Shell Oil Co., 1992 WL 144296, No. CV. 91-0589-RJK, at *10 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 16, 1992). In Shell, the oil company defendants argued “that plaintiffs are not entitled
to recover because defendants’ actions were undertaken pursuant to contracts between them
and the United States.” The court responded:
. . .42 U.S.C. § 9620 addresses the issues of government contractor liability in the
CERCLA context. It provides that nothing in this section shall be construed to affect
the liability of any person or entity under sections 9606 and 9607 . . . . In light of § 9620
and the strict liability language of § 107, this affirmative defense is inappropriate and
inconsistent with the third-party defense provided within § 107. As such, it is
dismissed.
Id.
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a matter of federal common law which displaces state law. Because
federal procurement actively implicates ‘uniquely federal interests’
in ‘getting the Government’s work done,’ when the three
referenced elements are present, state tort law significantly
conflicts with federal interests and federal common law preempts it,
210
providing a complete defense against state law claims.

In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the United States
Supreme Court thoroughly discussed the application of the
211
government contractor defense. There, a wrongful death suit was
brought against an independent contractor who manufactured the
helicopter and faulty escape-hatch system that ultimately resulted in a
navy pilot’s death after the helicopter crashed off the coast of
212
The Court recognized the potential conflict between
Virginia.
federal interests and state tort law with respect to government
procurement contracts.213 The court examined the government
contractor defense in the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act
214
(“FTCA”), which is a consent to suit against the United States for
the negligent or wrongful conduct of government employees, except
as to those claims that are “based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of the federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”215 Accordingly,
government contractors are not subject to liability “when (1) the
United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the
equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier
warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United
States.”216
Perhaps the most significant requirement of this three part test in
the context of NRD actions is the United States’ approval of
“reasonably precise specifications.” The United States Supreme
Court discussed the discretionary function exception in Berkovitz v.
United States:

210. Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp., 962 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Md. 1997) (citation omitted)
(quoting Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504, 512 (1988)).
211. 487 U.S. 500, 503-14 (1988).
212. Id. at 502-03.
213. Id. at 511.
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
215. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000)).
216. 487 U.S. at 512.
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In examining the nature of the challenged conduct, a court must
first consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting
employee. This inquiry is mandated by the language of the
exception; conduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves an
element of judgment or choice. . . . Thus, the discretionary function
exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or
policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to
follow. In this event, the employee has no rightful option but to
adhere to the directive. And if the employee’s conduct cannot
appropriately be the product of judgment or choice, then there is
no discretion in the conduct for the discretionary function
exception to protect.
. . . The exception, properly construed, therefore protects only
governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of
public policy. . . . In sum, the discretionary function exception
insulates the Government from liability if the action challenged in
217
the case involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment.

Thus, for the government contractor defense to apply, the
government must have made a decision relating to the conduct at
issue; that is, the government must have exercised a discretionary
function.
Courts have consistently held in environmental contamination
cases where a defendant is asserting a government contractor defense
that the United States never manifested the requisite approval of the
manner and type of waste disposal activities that were responsible for
218
the contamination of natural resources.
In Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., property
owners brought a suit against a gaseous diffusion plant to recover for
environmental damages caused by discharges of pollutants into the
219
The
atmosphere, soil, bodies of water, and ditches at the plant.
defendants moved for summary judgment based on its relationship
with the United States as a government contractor.220 The defendants
217. 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988).
218. Chris M. Amantea, The Growth of Environmental Issues in Government Contracting,
43. AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1612-13 (1994) (“Government contractors cannot look to sovereign
immunity to shield them from environmental liabilities. Although the “government contractor
defense” may provide some protection in this regard, typically this defense is used successfully
only against tort and product liability claims”(citing Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint
Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing historical use of defense in cases where military
personnel sued military contractors in product liability cases); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d
556, 567 (5th Cir. 1985) (providing that basis for government contractor defense in products
liability action lies in federal common law); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 252
(3d Cir. 1982) (holding government contractor defense is available in strict liability cases).
219. 835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
220. Id. at 961-62.
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argued that the Department of Energy (“DOE”) exercised
substantial control over operations at the facilities, and therefore all
221
In
activities fell within the discretionary function exception.
denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court
held that “[t]he defendants have failed to present specific evidence
regarding the directions and orders that the DOE gave with respect
to waste management units at the plant.”222 Therefore, the defendants
did not satisfy the first element of the government contractor defense
by demonstrating that the pollution resulted from express approval
and direction of the government.
In Arness v. Boeing North American, Inc., the plaintiffs filed suit
against the defendant asserting violations of state environmental laws
stemming from the release and disposal of trichloroethylene (“TCE”)
which contaminated the groundwater, soil and subsurface soil of the
area surrounding a facility which manufactured and tested rocket
223
The defendant argued that the contamination resulted
engines.
from rocket engine contracts that were performed pursuant to the
224
specific direction and control of the United States. The defendant
argued that the United States had specifically required the use of
225
TCE. The court ultimately determined that the defendant failed to
prove that he was “acting under” the direction of a federal officer,
stating,
[The Defendant’s] use of TCE did not cause Plaintiffs’ injuries.
Rather, Plaintiffs’ injuries were allegedly caused by [Defendant]’s
negligent disposal and storage of TCE, which activities were not
performed at the government’s behest. In fact, [the Defendant]
declares that. . . “[t]he government did not specify safeguards to
prevent the release of TCE to the air and ground in these flushing

221. Id. at 966.
222. Id. at 968.
223. 997 F. Supp. 1268, 1270 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1998) (order granting motion to remand). In
Arness, the court examined the issue of governmental direction and control in light of
defendants’ removal of the case pursuant to the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1442(a)(1) (2000), which states that an action filed against “[t]he United States or any agency
thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any
agency thereof, sued in an official capacity for any act under color of such office or on account
of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress” may be removed to federal
court. Although the court did not expressly address the likelihood that the defendant’s
government contractor defense would actually succeed in light of the facts, the reasoning used
by the court is parallel to that which a court would use to examine the discretionary function
exception when considering the applicability of the government contractor defense. See id. at
1272-75.
224. Id. at 1272.
225. Id.
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procedures.” . . . Furthermore, . . .[the Defendant] does not submit
any evidence that the government required . . .[the Defendant] to
store the TCE in a particular manner which resulted in the alleged
226
release of TCE that caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.

In New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v.
ExxonMobil Corp., the State of New Jersey filed an NRD action in
New Jersey state court against ExxonMobil for contamination
resulting from refinery operations, alleging violations of the New
227
Jersey Spill Act and common law nuisance and trespass claims.
Defendant ExxonMobil Corporation removed the case to federal
court, arguing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, asserting the
government contractor defense.228 The court remanded the case,
stating with regard to the government contractor defense that “it is
not entirely clear that this defense, which sounds in products liability,
would apply here, to an issue turning on the construction of state
environmental law.”229
In addition, the court stated that
ExxonMobil’s claim that the Petroleum Administration for War
exerted control over “the manufacture, production, storage, and
transfer of petroleum products” failed to establish the government’s
control over improper waste disposal methods, the action causing the
injury of which the plaintiffs complained.230
As demonstrated by the reasoning of the courts in the
aforementioned cases, a defendant must provide specific evidence
demonstrating that any discharges or improper waste disposal
occurred with the express approval and direction of the federal
government to satisfy the first prong of the requirements of the
government contractor defense. Given the historic overall lack of
success defendants have had with such a defense in environmental

226. Id. at 1274-75. Similarly, in Bahrs v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 795 F. Supp. 965 (D. Ariz.
1992), the defendant attempted to invoke federal jurisdiction by arguing it had acted under the
direction of federal government when disposing of waste products that led to the contamination
of the plaintiffs’ water supply. The court held that “[w]hile the government officials were
undoubtedly most interested in the production of war materials, the record before this Court
does not demonstrate the government’s necessary control over the method of waste disposal.
The mere fact that the government possessed the power to exercise control over the project
does not establish that the power was ever in fact exercised.” Id. at 970.
227. No. Hud-L 4415-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 18, 2004).
228. Notice of Removal at § 1.20, New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
No. Hud-L 4415-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 18, 2004).
229. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. ExxonMobil Corp. 381 F.Supp. 2d 398, 404, (D.N.J.
2005).
230. Id. at 8.
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contamination cases, it is unlikely that it will succeed in future NRD
cases.
A key consideration in this type of defense is absolute joint and
several liability - it is ultimately irrelevant if a portion of NRD
occurred during war. Furthermore, if a defendant raises this type of
defense, he ultimately bears the burden of proof as to the degree of
his contribution to the contamination.
7. Statutory Immunity
Along the same lines as the government contractor defense,
defendants may also assert defenses based on immunity provisions
found in certain federal statutes regarding government contracts. The
Defense Production Act of 1950 (“DPA”), contains immunity
provisions for defendant contractors performing contracts entered
into pursuant to those statutes. The “DPA” states in relevant part:
“No person shall be held liable for damages or penalties for any act or
failure to act resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with a
rule, regulation, or order issued pursuant to this Act . . . .”231 For
purposes of this analysis, the application of DPA immunity will be
examined in the context of the numerous “Agent Orange” suits.
In Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co., civilians in Vietnam filed a suit
against “Agent Orange” manufacturers, claiming injuries resulting
232
The defendants argued
from exposure to the chemical defoliant.
that the case should be removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442,
asserting the government contractor defense and immunity under the
DPA.233 Although the court ruled that the DPA was a “colorable”
defense for purposes of removal, the court questioned the validity of
such claims of immunity, stating,
There is a dispute as to whether section 707 [of the DPA] provides
immunity against tort suits based in strict liability and negligence of
the sort the civilian plaintiffs wish to pursue. On a previous
occasion, this court was inclined to view section 707 as immunizing
contractors only for contract damages, although it did not rule on
234
the issue.

The “previous occasion” referenced by the Ryan court was the
Eastern District of New York’s decision in In re “Agent Orange”
Product Liability Litigation, in which the defendant manufacturers

231.
232.
233.
234.

50 U.S.C. App. § 2157.
781 F. Supp. 934, 936 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
Id. at 938.
Id. at 945.
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argued that, under the DPA, they should not be held liable for
complying with “Agent Orange” production contracts entered into
235
with the United States government. As noted in Ryan, the Agent
Orange court held that immunity under the DPA did not necessarily
extend to liability for torts:
It is indisputable that the statutory ancestors of section 707 only
immunized contractors from liability for breach of contract
damages; the law was explicit on that point.
It is telling that neither the Defense Production Act itself nor the
legislative history made any reference to tort claims despite the fact
that, as evidenced by this suit, the contracts “rated” under the Act
“involve items, the production of which may . . . giv[e] rise to the
236
possibility of an enormous amount of claims.”
If section 707 is to be applied to tort claims at all, it should only be
read to bar claims for strict liability, not negligence. The former
involve holding a defendant liable despite the fact that it may not
have been at fault and the liability thus truly “result[s] . . . from
compliance with . . . this Act.” Whether this last interpretation or
one not applying section 707 to tort suits altogether is adopted, the
237
Defense Production Act would not bar plaintiffs’ claims.

Similarly, in Hercules, Inc. v. United States, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit examined the scope of immunity of section 707
238
In Hercules, manufacturers sued the United States
of the DPA.
government to recover expenses incurred as a result of Agent Orange
litigation.239 The defendants argued that because the government had
compelled them to enter into contracts for the production of “Agent
Orange” pursuant to section 101 of the DPA, the defendants were
entitled to immunity under section 707 for both contract and tort
240
suits. The court disagreed, stating:
The language of section 101(a) makes it clear that the purpose of
the statute is to authorize the President to dictate that preference
be given the government contracts which are necessary to promote
the national defense. . . . Significantly, section 101(a) does not
mention either the specific nature of performance under a DPA
contract, or the subsequent use of goods produced under such a
contract. Therefore, we conclude that, while the risk imposed by

235. 597 F. Supp. 740, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2nd Cir. 1987).
236. Id. at 845 (quoting S. REP. NO. 85-2281, reprinted at 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4043, 4045
(1958)).
237. Id. (quoting section 707 of the DPA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2157).
238. 24 F.3d 188 (Fed. Cir. 1994), aff’d, 516 U.S. 417 (1996).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 202-203 (noting that 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(a)(1964) authorizes the President “to
compel contract performance as well as contract acceptance”).
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section 101(a) does include the possible need of a contractor to
break its contracts with third parties in order to give preference to a
DPA contract, it does not include the risk that the product
produced under the DPA contract will be inherently unsafe to
241
users.

Consistent with the court’s reasoning in In re Agent Orange,
immunity under the DPA would not apply to defendants who
improperly dispose of waste or discharge hazardous substances
despite the existence of a contract with the government. Unless a
contract with the government explicitly directs and authorizes the
waste disposal and discharge methods to be undertaken by a
defendant, it is difficult to see how the DPA can successfully be
asserted as a defense to liability for NRD.
8. Standing to Bring NRD Claims
Defendants may also contend that the state does not have
sufficient standing to bring NRD claims.
In Department of
Environmental Protection v. Jersey Central Power and Light Co., the
State of New Jersey filed suit against a public utility engaged in the
242
The court held that the state,
operation of a nuclear power plant.
seeking to recover damages as parens patriae for damage to fisheries
caused by the defendant’s cooling water discharges during plant
operations, had standing to seek both an injunction and damages.243
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the state did
not have a proprietary right to the fish in its waters sufficient to
244
Affirming the judgment of the
support an action for damages.
lower court, the court stated that the State of New Jersey has “not
only the right but also the affirmative fiduciary obligation to ensure
that the rights of the public to a viable marine environment are
protected, and to seek compensation for any diminution in the trust
corpus.’”245 The court further said that “absent some special interest
in some private citizen, it was questionable whether anyone but the
state could be considered the proper party to sue for recovery of
damages to the environment.”246

241. Id. at 203.
242. 336 A.2d 750 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), aff’d., 336 A.2d 750 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976).
243. Id. at 759.
244. Id. at 758759.
245. Id. at 759 (quoting Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. V. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 308 A.2d
671, 674 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973).
246. Id.
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Some defendants have even gone so far as to question a state’s
inherent right to protect its natural resources as a public trustee. In
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. ExxonMobil
Corp., the defendant made the following argument:
State ownership of natural resources derives from the sovereign
rights of the British Crown and of the United States, and is
governed by federal law, since under the equal footing doctrine
these rights must be the same in all states. Plaintiffs’ expansive
theories of natural resource ownership and damages go beyond the
sovereign rights transmitted to New Jersey by the British Crown at
independence in 1776, and would offend the equal footing doctrine
247
if they were upheld.

ExxonMobil essentially argued that New Jersey exceeded its
authority by attempting to bring NRD claims pursuant to the New
Jersey Spill Act and common law. This case is currently pending in
New Jersey state court. Given New Jersey’s historical pattern of
upholding the State’s authority to bring NRD claims, it is unlikely this
defense will be successful.
III. CONCLUSION
The preservation, protection, and reclamation of natural
resources have become increasingly more important as the
devastating impact of contamination is revealed. The multiplying
number of NRD cases that are filed each year serves as a testament to
this fact. The process of resolving these cases will force the courts
and litigants to take a hard look at the available universe of
approaches. Because of the highly specific nature of each NRD case,
the manner of application and the success of these claims will only be
realized over time as NRD is examined on a case by case basis.

247. Notice of Removal at 1.20(e), New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
No. Hud-L 4415-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 18, 2004).

